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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
would afford ample protection against being forced into unintended
arbitration. Third, assuming that the defrauded party has a valid
claim of a right to rescind the principal contract and that the arbitrator
is competent, it should make no difference if the dispute is resolved
by arbitration rather than by the judicial process unless the claimant
is forum-shopping or seeking a jury determination.18 The last three
considerations, combined with a public policy in favor of arbitration,
outweigh the single assent consideration and require a negative answer
to the basic question.
The Second Circuit has apparently chosen the better rule: arbitra-
tion provisions are separable and a claim of fraudulent inducement
of a contract containing an arbitration clause should be arbitrated
regardless of the relief sought unless the arbitration clause was itself
fraudulently induced or the arbitration clause was inserted as part of
an overall scheme to defraud.
FTC PRELIMINARY RELIEF POWERS UNDER SECTION 7
OF THE CLAYTON ACT
Respondents Dean Foods Company and Bowman Dairy Company,
substantial competitors in the sale of packaged milk, planned to merge.
Dean was to purchase substantially all of Bowman's assets and Bow-
man was to cease doing business. The Federal Trade Commission,
after issuing a formal complaint under section 7 of the Clayton Act'
and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,2 applied to the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals for a preliminary injunction to main-
tain the status quo until the Commission could hold hearings to deter-
mine the legality of the merger. Dismissal of the Commission's petition
was appealed to the Supreme Court which reversed and held: The
FTC has the power to seek preliminary injunctions in the courts of
'At least one court has rejected what appeared to be a forum-shopping attempt.
Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463, 466-67, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353,
357-58 (1961) (contract allegedly void for lack of mutuality.) Plaintiff apparently
argued that because no court would enforce his promise to employ defendant for life,
no arbitrator should be given an opportunity to do so. The court rejected the con-
tention, reasoning that by agreeing to arbitrate, plaintiff had agreed to forgo courts
in favor of a private judge. By implication the court held that plaintiff had assumed
the risk that an arbitrator might resolve a dispute differently from a court.
S64 Stat. 1125 (1950), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
a38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §45 (1964).
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appeals which, under authority of the All Writs Act 3, may issue orders
maintaining the status quo while Commission proceedings are in
progress involving probable violations of section 7 of the Clayton Act.
FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
The Clayton Act gives the Department of Justice powers of enforce-
ment concurrent with those of the FTC with respect to mergers and
acquisitions.4 The statute specifically authorizes the Commission to
issue cease and desist orders5 and empowers the Antitrust Division to
seek preliminary relief in the district courts.6 It is silent, however,
with respect to the Commission's power to obtain preliminary relief.7
Effective remedial action is predicated upon arresting a pending merger
or acquisition before it progresses to a point where the acquired con-
cern no longer exists, or where the companies involved become so
inextricably intertwined that they cannot be restored to their original
competitive status.s This has prompted most commentators and the
FTC to conclude that the Commission cannot effectively enforce sec-
tion 7 without some provision for preliminary relief in the difficult
case.9 One solution to the problem is congressional action amending
the statute to give the Commission explicit authority either to seek the
required preliminary relief in an appropriate court or to issue prelimi-
nary cease and desist orders in its own right."° Such Congressional
action has not been forthcoming, however, and the principal case pre-
sents a judicial solution."
'28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1964).
'Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 243 (1956) (testimony of Congress-
man Cellar) [hereinafter cited as 1956 Hearings]. See FTC v. International Paper
Co., 241 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir. 1956); KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTrrRUST POLICy 246(1959) ; Elman, Rtlemaking Procedures in the FTC's Enforcement of the Merger Law,
78 HARv. L. REv. 385, 387 (1964).
538 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1964).
'38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §25 (1964).
'FTC v. International Paper Co., 241 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir. 1956); Board of
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Transamerica Corp., 184 F.2d 311, 315 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 883 (1950).
' See 1956 Hearings 245; H.R. REP. No. 486, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1957);
Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary for
the House of Representatives, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
1961 Hearings] ;Duke, Scope of Relief Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 63
COLUm. L. REv. 1192 (1963); Note, 79 HAmv. L. REv. 391, 392 (1965); Note, 40
N.Y.U.L. REv. 771 (1965).
'See KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTrTRuST POLICY 258 (1959) ; 79 HARV. L. Ra,. 391,
392-93 (1965); Comment, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1297 (1957); Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
771 (1965).
"1961 Hearings 88; 1956 Hearings 225. See FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384
U.S. 597, 609 (1966).
U'Prior judicial responses to this problem conflict. FTC v. International Paper
Co., 241 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir. 1956):
[ VOL. 42: 621
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The majority opinion noted that under the All Writs Act12 the
courts of appeals had not been confined to the issuance of writs in aid
of jurisdiction already acquired, but that this power extended to cases
prospectively within appellate jurisdiction, though no appeal had been
perfected. Prior decisions of the Supreme Court have recognized a
limited judicial power to issue writs maintaining the status quo by
injunction prior to completion of agency action pending review through
the prescribed statutory channels. Thus, the grant of power in section
I I(c) of the Clayton Act, 13 giving the courts of appeals exclusive
jurisdiction to review final FTC orders, includes the power to issue
preliminary injunctions, preserving the status quo and protecting the
court's jurisdiction to review final FTC orders. The Commission's
capacity to seek these orders was held to be incidental to its main
function--enforcing section 7 of the Clayton Act. In the absence of
explicit direction from Congress to the contrary, the majority could
find no basis for denying an agency charged with protection of the
public interest the right to exercise "its inherent standing as a suitor
to seek preliminary relief in courts of appropriate jurisdiction."'14
Mr. Justice Fortas, with whom three justices concurred, dissented:
This decision cannot be supported. Not a single one of the prior
decisions of this court cited as authority sustains it, either specifically or
directly, or by principle of analogy.... The plain uninistabable intent
of the Congress in defining the Commission's powers and the jurisdiction
of the courts of appeals is that no such threshold injunctive power is
available at the Commission's behest.'5
The All Writs Act, according to the dissent, was designed as an imple-
menting statute to effectuate exercise of appellate jurisdiction by
These specific provisions as to who may seek injunctive relief, and in what
courts, imply that the Commission itself is not authorized to do so. This impli-
cation is required by the statutory provisions of 15 U.S.C.A. § 21 under which
a court of appeals acquires jurisdiction to review an order of the Commission
only after the administrative proceeding has been concluded and a transcript of
the record therein filed with the court. [Footnote omitted.]
A prior case involving the power of courts of appeals to issue preliminary orders
upon application of the Federal Reserve Board reached a contrary result. Board of
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Transamerica Corp., 184 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1950).
That court asserted jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a)
(1964), and its grant of power to protect the exercise of the court's jurisdiction to
review Board orders.
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1964):
The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
" 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21(c) (1964).
1,384 U.S. at 608.
Ir Id. at 612.
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correcting deficiencies in procedure. The act is abused when "con-
torted to confer jurisdiction where Congress has plainly withheld it."'"
There is support for the majority's conclusion in the principal case
that the All Writs Act includes a grant of judicial power to issue
injunctions to preserve the status quo while administrative proceedings
are in progress since it prevents impairment of the effective exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.17 The All Writs Act has long been regarded as
general authority for appellate court power to issue extraordinary writs
for all types of cases,' 8 and this authority extends to cases prospec-
tively within appellate jurisdiction even though no appeal has been
perfected. 9 In Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co.,20 the Court
reasoned that power to preserve the status quo was merely incidental
to jurisdiction for final review, but was not to be recognized in deroga-
tion of a clear Congressional intent proscribing judicial intervention.
The Court, in Arrow, refused to enjoin certain rate changes because
the ICC Act specifically prescribes a maximum period for postpone-
ment of rate changes while those changes are under consideration by
the board.2'
The primary issue raised by the principal case is one of statutory
' ld. at 622.
"Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658 (1963). See Whitney Nat'l
Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U.S. 411 (1965); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc.
v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942). Because protecting the public interest is of principal
concern, no artificial restrictions on a court's power to grant equitable relief in the
furtherance of that interest will be allowed. Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v.
FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Cf. West India Fruit & S.S. Co. v.
Seatrain Lines, Inc., 170 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1948) (distinguished between preserva-
tion of the status quo and intervention in the agency's exercise of its powers). A
court of appeals has authority to issue injunctions under Fn. R. Civ. P. 62(g)
when read with 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) (1964), and the power should be exercised if
otherwise jurisdiction might be ousted and the moving party is a public agency
clothed with specific responsibility in the matters involved. Public Util. Comm'n
v. Capital Transit Co., 214 F.2d 242, 245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
11 Whitney Nat'l Bank, supra note 17; Arrow Transp. Co., supra note 17, at 679
(dissenting opinion of Clark, J.); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc., supra note 17, at
9-10. See Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Note, 77 HAgv. L. Rzv. 1539, 1542 (1964). Cf. Continental
Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 675 (1934).
Contra, Stell v. Sabannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 318 F.2d 425, 426 (5th
Cir. 1963) ; Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258 (1947).
'9Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 25 (1943). See McClellan v.
Carland, 217 U.S. 268 (1910); President & Directors of Georgetown College, supra
note 18. See also FFn. R. Civ. P. 62(g) which recognizes the "power of an appellate
court or of a judge or justice thereof to ... grant an injunction during the pendency
of an appeal or to make any order appropriate to preserve the status quo or the
effectiveness of the judgment subsequently to be entered."
"372 U.S. 658, 673 (1963).
"Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting, would have recognized jurisdiction of the courts
of appeals: "A simple grant of jurisdiction to an administrative agency without
reference to a long-recognized equity jurisdiction which is not inconsistent there-
with is a strange way to dispose of judicial power." 372 U.S. at 679.
[ VOL.. 42: 621
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interpretation. Does the Clayton Act manifest a clear Congressional
intention to prohibit preliminary injunctions in Commission proceed-
ings? If a clear expression akin to that in the ICC statute is required,2
then the majority is justified in allowing the courts of appeals to issue
preliminary writs in FTC proceedings. Literally, the Clayton Act
does no more than grant the courts of appeals jurisdiction to review
final agency orders. It does not preclude the majority's use of the All
Writs Act in the principal case.
It is argued that the result reached in Dean Foods will vest courts
of appeals with a fact finding function outside their area of compe-
tence.25 Preliminary injunctions in merger cases almost always involve
presentation by the parties of a full case and a large amount of evi-
dence. 4 Hearings of this nature, however, are not beyond the compe-
tence of the circuit courts. The Clayton Act grants these courts the
power to modify final Commission orders.25 A court that can modify
a final order in a complicated merger or acquisition proceeding and,
in addition, issue orders pendente lite, should be capable of determining
the desirability and propriety of a preliminary injunction. 6
The assertion by the majority that the Federal Trade Commission
has standing to seek preliminary orders in the courts of appeals is
'When Congress ousts jurisdiction it does so explicitly. See, e.g., INT. REv.
CODE or 1954, § 7421; Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964).
384 U.S. at 623 (dissenting opinion of Fortas, J.).
KAYSEN & TURNER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 258; 1961 Hearings 71 (testimony
of Hon. L. Lovinger); id. at 86 (testimony of Paul Rand Dixon); 1956 Hearings
248 (testimony of Chairman Gwynne). See United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,
320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963); United States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp.
518 (D.N.J. 1965).
-73 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21(c) (1964).
:' A conclusion to the contrary would require an unrealistic view of the role of
these courts, particularly with respect to injunctions. Compare United States v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963), with United States v. Penick &
Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965).
Ultimate facts which must be found in order for an injunction to issue in any
Clayton Act proceeding are: (1) it is reasonably probable that the FTC will issue a
cease and desist order; (2) the preliminary relief sought is necessary to prevent
irreparable injury; (3) the injunction will not subject the defendant to unnecessary
hardship. Fact finding of this nature is not a function so foreign to courts of ap-
peals that it should warrant a different decision in the principal case. See Public
Util. Comm'n v. Capital Transit Co., 214 F2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Courts of ap-
peals dispose of many applications for injunctions or stays pending appeal, present-
ing issues no more difficult to determine than those in the principal case. See, e.g.,
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Dunn v.
Retail Clerks Ass'n, Local 1529, 299 F.2d 873 (6th Cir. 1962) (refused to grant
injunction because it would decide the merits of the case).
' See, e.g., Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U.S. 411 (1965)
(Federal Reserve Board) ; Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Transamerica
Corp., 184 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1950) (Federal Reserve Board); Scripps-Howard
Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942) (FCC) ; Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n,
supra note 26 (Federal Power Comm'n).
19671
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sound. Agencies have been allowed to seek myriad rulings and orders
without express legislative authority. 7 The intent of Congress should
control, and with the Clayton Act Congress sought to provide a means
by which the FTC and the courts could deal with monopoly in its
incipiency, particularly the trend toward monopoly reflected in the
increasing number of mergers.2 8 The primary concern is preservation
of competition,29 and to this objective the Court properly addressed
itself. The dissent pursues a phantom in attempting to infer Congres-
sional intention from the interstices of legislation. ° Mr. Justice For-
tas, dissenting, placed great emphasis on the Clayton Act's detailed
enumeration of FTC procedures and its silence with respect to the
Commission's power to seek preliminary orders, in contrast to the
express grant of such preliminary power to the Attorney General,3 and
to private parties. 32 The result reached in the principal case, however,
based as it is on legislative history and analogous precedent, is more
rational than the position advocated by the dissent which requires
negative implications based on little more than congressional silence.
The result reached in the principal case is essential from the stand-
point of antitrust policy. Enforcement by the Antitrust Division has
not been sufficient. Apart from congressional intention that the FTC be
the primary "guardian of the public interest" in merger proceedings,
section 7 of the Clayton Act requires energetic enforcement and no one
agency possesses sufficient manpower resources to accomplish the job
effectively.3 Effective enforcement should not depend upon which
'See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Briggs Mfg. Co.
v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. 177, aff'd, 280 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1960); S. REP. No. 1775,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) ; 1956 Hearings (testimony of Sen. Sparkman) ; H.R. REP.
No. 486, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) ; Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 771 (1965).
See 1961 Hearings 42-43 (testimony of Congressman Patman).
o "To explain the cause of non-action by Congress when Congress itself shed no
light is to venture into speculative unrealities." Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S.
106, 119-20 (1940). "It is at best treacherous to find in Congressional silence alone
the adoption of a controlling rule of law." Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 418 (1962)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). See Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4,
9-11 (1942); West India Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 170 F.2d 775
(2d Cir. 1948).
'138 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §25 (1964).
3"38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §26 (1964).
See KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 246-48 (1959). For a discussion of
the compelling reasons behind the FTC's demand for preliminary relief power see
generally Brief for Appellant, pp. 22-35, FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597
(1966); MASSEL, COMPETITION & MONOPOLY 321 (1962); 1961 Hearings; H.R. REP.
No. 486, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); 1956 Hearings; Elman, Rdemaking Proce-
dures in the FTC's Enforcement of the Merger Law, 78 HARV. L. REv. 385, 387
(1964); Comment, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1297 (1957); Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 771(1965); Note, 79 HARv. L. REv. 391 (1965).
The dissent notes that the statute appears to provide that the Commission should
turn cases requiring preliminary relief over to the Department of Justice. 384 U.S.
[ VOL. 42: 621
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
agency initiates action, the Commission or the Antitrust Division. 4
It will no longer be possible for parties served with Commission com-
plaints to proceed with planned mergers or acquisitions by means of
delaying tactics, causing the acquired concern to disappear as a compet-
itive entity and frustrating hopes of preserving competition. 5
Although much can be said for the result reached in the principal
case, the majority failed to recognize certain problems inherent in its
decision. Prolonged preliminary relief is likely to be permanent relief
in many cases." Not all mergers, however, are anticompetitive in
effect. Because an acquisition or merger will often not survive a tem-
porary injunction, heel dragging enforcement should not be allowed to
deprive innocent parties of the economic benefit of their bargain. 7 A
preliminary injunction will not expedite enforcement proceedings un-
less the courts of appeals follow the lead of the seventh circuit and
place a time limit on the restraining order.3 The four month limit
imposed in the principal case on remand may not be long enough,
however, and the Commission should have the right to an extension if
it can show cause.
The experience of the Department of Justice with regard to obtain-
ing preliminary orders illustrates another problem. It is difficult to
make the requisite showing of a reasonable probability that the Clay-
ton Act is being violated. Although the district courts have set varying
standards, one judge went as far as requiring that the Department
establish to a certainty that the defendant was violating the statute. 9
Moreover, the Court's decision in Dean Foods, focusing on the need
at 615. Although this may be true, it does not appear that either agency has developed
a means for utilizing the particular skills of the other or that the FTC has called
upon the Department more than once. 1961 Hearings 71. Furthermore, the position
taken by the dissent does allow for further development by each agency of areas of
expertise. The Commission should be allowed to carry on effectively its own pro-
ceedings without turning the case over to the antitrust division and the courts.
Brief for Appellant, pp. 32-33, FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
1961 Hearings 43; 1956 Hearings 235.
See Note, 79 HAnv. L. REv. 391, 392 (1965). The situation is graphically
illustrated by Farm Journal, Inc., FTC No. 6388, where the Commission lost its
petition to the Third Circuit for a preliminary injunction and, by the time hearings
were concluded, the acquired concern no longer existed as an entity and could not
be restored to competitive status. See H.R. REP. No. 486, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1957).
' Note, 79 HARv. L. REv. 391, 393 (1965).
Substantial costs are incurred in arranging complex corporate reorganizations.
Ibid. See, e.g., Maryland Gas. Co. v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 1964 Trade Cas. 1 71,
188 at 79, 725 (D.D.C.) ($485,000); United States v. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.),
1961 Trade Cas. 1 70, 131, 78, 522 (N.D. Cal.) ($1,100,000). As cited in Note, 79
HAR%. L. REv. 391 (1965).




for an effective remedy and protection of the courts of appeals' juris-
diction for review, could lead to a reduction of the requisite showing
for obtaining preliminary orders.40 On remand of the principal case,
an injunction was issued on the basis "that it is reasonably probable
that the purchase agreement . . . between Dean and Bowman may
ultimately be determined by the Federal Trade Commission to be in
violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act." (Emphasis added.)" It is
possible that all the Commission will need to show in future cases is a
prospective impairment of effective remedial action, and a possibility
of a Clayton Act violation.
Despite the advantages to enforcement of such a reduction of the
burden of proof, such a result could subject the complexion of Clayton
Act enforcement to radical change. It is not difficult to show that a
proposed or pending merger possibly violates the Clayton Act using
the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in the recent Von's Grocery
Co. case.42 Indeed, a merger or acquisition approaches a per se
offense4" if the acquiring firm possesses more than a minimal share of
market power. Ultimately, the reasoning in the principal decision
combined with the reasoning in Von's Grocery Co. may foreclose
chances of legally selling or combining to better compete. Thus, the
decision could have a major adverse impact on smaller competitors,44
those whom the statute arguably was designed to protect.45
"o The burden of gathering the large amount of evidence necessary for success
in obtaining a preliminary injunction is largely responsible for the protracted
nature of the proceeding. To expedite the process would require adoption of one of
two approaches: revising statutory standards to diminish the quantity of evidence
needed and to limit the number of relevant issues; or substantially altering both
judicial and administrative enforcement procedures. KAYSEN & TURNER, Op. Cit.
supra note 4, at 248.P. B-3, BNA ATTR No. 267, August 23, 1966.
"United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1966). See Fortune,
July 1, 1966, p. 65.
It might be concluded that Von's Grocery Co. dealt a death blow to the concept
of reasonable probability. "The incipiency doctrine and the test dealing with
elimination of substantial competitors have been made presumptions of illegality
rather than aids in determining whether there is a 'reasonable probability' of ad-
verse effects on competition." Note, 41 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 263, 270 (1966).
The only underlying principle of the majority opinion "that I can find is that in
litigation under § 7, the Government always wins." United States v. Von's Grocery
Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"Small businessmen should favor continuing "rule of reason" methods of exten-
sive inquiry in adjudicating the legality of mergers. Without use of "rule of
reason," § 7 might operate to strike down mergers of small firms or to obstruct their
opportunity to dispose of their businesses. Oppenheim, Small and Big Business:
Orientation of Antitrust Points and Counterpoints, 39 U. DET. L.J. 155, 162 (1961).
See also Fortas, Small Business, Mergers, and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 39
U. DET. L.J. 200, 202 (1961).
1956 Hearigs 235 (testimony of Sen. Sparkman).
[ VOL-. 42 : 621
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Further problems can be anticipated with respect to the Dean Foods
decision. The reasoning would seem to be easily applicable to enforce-
ment provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The enforce-
ment section of that act is almost identical to section 11 of the Clayton
Act.46 Although Congress may have originally had conflicting motives
in establishing the Commission,4 7 it is apparent that currently Congress
looks to the Commission for enforcement. The Commission is likely to
seek preliminary relief power in areas other than section 7 of the
Clayton Act,4" and should this be accomplished with respect to section
5 of the FTC Act, the entire field of trade regulation would be affected
significantly.49 However, there are two basic hurdles which are not
likely to be overcome in seeking court sanction of preliminary power
in areas other than section 7 of the Clayton Act. First, only mergers
and acquisitions present fact situations with the compelling need for
relief required for an injunction under the Dean Foods rationale.
Second, section 7 of the Clayton Act presents a special need for quick
and effective enforcement. Congress enacted that statute to counter
monopoly in its incipiency. The Commission will find it difficult to
pinpoint another aspect of anti-trust law enforcement which requires
immediate action preserving the status quo prior to hearings and a
determination of legality. Attempts by the Commission to extend the
decision in the principal case will probably prove futile.
" Compare 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 45(b), (c), (d) (1964), with 38 Stat.
744 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 2 1(c) (1964). See also Dixon, Significant New Commission
Developments, 21 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 247 (1962).
See HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE CommISSION 19-27 (1924).
' A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEcTION 247 (1962). Arguing for the grant to the Commis-
sion of power to issue preliminary cease and desist orders, Chairman Paul Rand
Dixon cited the area of deceptive practices as being one where such power was
necessary from the Commission's standpoint.
'" Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits unfair methods of competition and is
expanding in scope (already including §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, with strong
advocates for Robinson-Patman type application). See Eine Kleine Juristische
Schuntmergeschichte, 79 HARv. L. REv. 921, 933 (1965).
1967]
